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Future of Law & Development, Part I

THERE IS NO SINGLE FIELD OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
Katharina Pistor*
Let me begin—following Ohnesorge8 following Trubek and Santos9—
with the notion that the concepts of ―law and development‖ and ―rule of
law‖ are closely intermingled with the process of legal reform in developing
countries and the role foreign advisers and multilateral institutions play in
that undertaking. Describing the ―field‖ in this fashion reveals that the glue
that holds together a set of disparate activities by disparate actors (for under
what other circumstances do we assume common ground between family
and securities lawyers, or professors and world bankers?) is a shared belief
in the virtue of law.
The beauty of the ―law and development‖ ideal and the ―rule of law‖
ideal is that hardly anybody can disagree with the goal of building a neutral
and universally accessible institutional framework that is meant to benefit
all people irrespective of race, gender, social status, or membership in a particular clan or group. This unity of purpose also means that academics and
policy advisers across the political spectrum can join forces. When resources are constrained, we do not have to discuss whether political reforms
should precede economic reforms, whether land reform supersedes investments in infrastructure, or whether educational or health reforms should
take precedence over building stock markets or establishing antitrust agencies. Instead, we can all promote legal development reforms based on the
assumption that building a sound legal system will ultimately further all of
the above. Studies indicating a strong correlation between the ―rule of law‖
and economic growth appear to buttress that assumption.10
Obviously, however, correlations do not prove causation. And it is
disconcerting that we lack a sound theoretical basis for explaining why the
correlation between legal development and economic growth holds across
some countries, but breaks down in others. Nor do we have a good handle
on why legal reforms frequently fail to deliver the expected results and,
sometimes, correlate to events the opposite of those anticipated.11 In short,
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we continue to know very little about the political economy of legal reforms
and their distributional effects. If we believe strongly enough that good law
creates a win-win situation whereby today’s losers will tomorrow happily
join today’s winners without dethroning them, we need not bother. But beliefs do not add up to an academic field—and for good reason.
Take, for example, the relation between the ―rule of law‖ and the status
of women in society. The status of women in society can serve as a heuristic device. Women represent the systematically disenfranchised: they can be
found in all societies, and all societies tend to discriminate against women,
or at least share a legacy of discriminating against them.12 On their face, the
ideals that underpin legal reform efforts13 suggest that women should benefit from the rule of law as an alternative to entrenched social norms. Yet
closer inspection reveals that in most parts of the world there is at best a
weak correlation between the status of women in society and the ―rule of
law,‖ notwithstanding comprehensive law reform efforts to advance their
rights.14
But this example may not prove much. Indeed, one might argue that,
with some patience, law will eventually benefit women in countries around
the globe. However, unless we have a sound theory that suggests under
what conditions women actually do gain from specific legal reforms and in
what ways, this strategy condemns us to an ―invisible hand‖15 approach.
Just as advocates of free markets assume that market forces will ultimately achieve the most efficient outcome, so too advocates of rule of law
reforms assume that they will ultimately serve the best outcome. Yet neither markets nor legal rules are ends in themselves—ultimately, both serve
broader social goals. Only with a clearer understanding of what these ends
ought to be can we begin to disentangle the relation between specific legal
reform efforts and the social and economic indicators used to assess and
measure the legal reform effort. And it is only with better goal identification that we can begin to appreciate alternatives to law that may achieve
similar social and economic outcomes, the acknowledgement of which
brings us squarely back to the Critical Legal Studies debates of the 1970s.
12

According to the Gender Gap index, even a country like Sweden discriminates against women.
See Katharina Pistor et al., Social Norms, Rule of Law, and Gender Reality: An Essay on the Limits of
the Dominant Rule of Law Paradigm, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 241–278 (James
J. Heckmann et al. eds., 2009).
13
Most central is the ideal of ―the rule of law.‖ For a critical review of this concept as a foundation
for data collection efforts, see Melissa Thomas, What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?,
EUR.
J.
DEV.
RES.
(2009),
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as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 35 (2003). Instead, Nussbaum advocates a list of substantive freedoms. Id. at 40–42.
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Accordingly, perhaps it is time to concede that there is no single field of
Law and Development. Instead, there are multiple disciplines that share a
common interest in the comparative development of (legal) institutions in
societies at different income levels.
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